NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 72 | Number 3

3-1-1994

Afterword: Shaw v. Reno
Robinson O. Everett

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robinson O. Everett, Afterword: Shaw v. Reno, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 761 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol72/iss3/6

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

Article 6

AFIERWORD
ROBINSON 0. EvER=r*

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Fifteenth Amendment speak in terms of persons rather -than groups. The
redistricting plan overturned in Shaw v. Reno' was at fault because it disregarded constitutionally recognized individual rights in favor of group rights.
Moreover, the concept of vicarious representation on which North Carolina's redistricting plan and others like it are based relies on the stereotype
that any person of one race has more in common with persons of that race
than with any person of another race-no matter what may be the relationship to the person of the other race. The effect is to perpetuate racial polarization in a purported effort to eliminate it.
Actually, the single-member congressional districts, which are mandated by federal statute2 and which are predicated on geography, are antithetical to the concept of proportional representation, which underlies the
North Carolina redistricting plan. The concept of proportional representation is also implicit in the preclearance requirement of the United States
Department of Justice that a legislature must create the maximum number
of possible majority-minority congressional districts.
Proponents of the redistricting explain that any inconsistency between
proportional and geographical representation is warranted by the goal of
diversity in the electoral process. This amounts to an end-justifies-themeans rationale. Some political scientists have concluded that the racially
gerrymandered districts do not necessarily lead to better substantive representation of minorities.3 The "safe" minority district may produce, in the
long run, an entrenched incumbent with little concern for his constituents.
Moreover, if racial diversity is so important, there are better ways to
achieve it. Indeed, by providing that a forty percent-plurality is sufficient
for victory in a primary election, North Carolina has already moved in that
direction.
Finally, I believe it important that Shaw, in line with the language of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and with recent cases dealing
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Chief Judge 1980-90, United States Court of Military
Appeals; A.B. 1947, Harvard University; S.D. 1950, Harvard University; L.L.M. 1959, Duke
University. Judge Everett was a plaintiff in Shaw v. Reno and argued the case before the United
States Supreme Court.
1. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
2. See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (1988).
3. See CAROL SWAM, BLACK FAcEs, BLACK INTERESTS (1993).
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with peremptory challenges, recognized the standing of whites to invoke the
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Certainly this ruling enhances the perception that the Constitution is for the benefit of all people.

MELVIN L. WArr*

"People, not trees or pastures, vote."' That rationale was the basis of
the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims2 which established the landmark "one person, one vote" principle. Almost thirty years
later, the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno3 focuses again on the
role of geographic factors (this time highways, rather than trees or pastures)
in defining the rights of voters in the electoral process. By focusing on the
geography of electoral districts, rather than on the people who vote in them,
the Supreme Court may be poised in future decisions to require a dramatic
change in the way voting districts are drawn. If so, the negative impact on
minority participation and influence in the electoral process could well be
as historic as the positive impact of the Court's one person, one vote
decision.
But there are troubling concerns about the rhetoric and reasoning of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaw that go beyond the impact the case
and its progeny could have on voting rights in this country. Subtle (perhaps
even racist) implications in the opinion suggest the serious failure of our
country to deal with issues of race, either from a personal or from a legal
perspective.
One such concern is the Court's implication that electoral districts that
are ten to twenty percent black, are somehow "integrated," while districts
that are forty to forty-five percent white constitute "racial apartheid." The
fact is that the electoral districts created to enhance minority representation
in North Carolina, and typically in other parts of the country, are more
racially mixed than other electoral districts. Must a voting district be majority white to qualify as integrated?
Another concern is the Court's implication that a white representative
can (and will) effectively represent the interests of both majority and minority constituents, but a minority representative can (and will) represent only
* Member 1993-, United States House of Representatives; Member 1985-86, North Carolina Senate; B.S. 1967, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1970, Yale University.
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).

1994]

AFTERWORD

the interests of minority constituents. The Supreme Court furthers no useful objective by perpetuating these kinds of misconceptions or stereotypes.
Finally, it is blatantly inconsistent for the Supreme Court to suggest
that minority voters might be better off in a thirty to forty percent "minority
influence" district because they can exercise substantial influence over their
white representative, while implying that white voters who constitute thirty
to forty of a majority-minority voting district somehow have no influence
and, furthermore, may be victims of racial apartheid.
In considering the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaw, it is important to
remember that voting rights litigation and the creation of majority-minority
districts usually take place against a historical backdrop of Jim Crow laws
and racially polarized voting. Patterns of racially polarized voting confirm
that race is still very much a factor in our daily lives. The aspiration expressed by the Court in Shaw that our laws be "color-blind" is an aspiration
to which we all subscribe. The Court must realize, however, that our laws
and the remedies they provide can be color-blind only when the actions of
our people are color-blind.

